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     UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
     SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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     JANE DOE,
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                   Plaintiff,
                                           New York, N.Y.
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                                         23 Civ. 6418 (JGLC)
                v.
     LEON BLACK,
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                   Defendant.
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      ----x
                                           Conference
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                                            November 7, 2024
                                             11:10 a.m.
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     Before:
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                       HON. JESSICA G. L. CLARKE,
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                                            District Judge
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                               APPEARANCES
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     WIGDOR LLP
          Attorneys for Plaintiff
17
     BY: JEANNE-MARIE BATES CHRISTENSEN
          MEREDITH A. FIRETOG
18
          DOUGLAS. H. WIGDOR
19
     QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART & SULLIVAN, LLP
20
          Attorneys for Defendant
     BY: SUSAN R. ESTRICH
21
          MICHAEL B. CARLINSKY
          JENNIFER J. BARRETT
22
23
     E. DANYA PERRY, PLLC
          Attorneys for Defendant
24
     BY: E. DANYA PERRY
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THE COURT: Good morning. We are here for an initial pretrial conference in Doe v. Black.

Who do we have here for the plaintiff?

MS. CHRISTENSEN: Good morning, your Honor. Jeanne Christensen, from Wigdor LLP, and I'm here with Meredith Firetog and Doug Wigdor.

THE COURT: Good morning.

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MR. WIGDOR: Good morning, your Honor.

THE COURT: And for the defendant.

MS. ESTRICH: Susan Estrich for Mr. Black, along with Mr. Carlinsky.

MR. CARLINSKY: Good morning, your Honor.

MS. PERRY: Danya Perry. Good morning.

MS. BARRETT: Good morning. I'm Jennifer Barrett from Quinn Emanuel.

THE COURT: Good morning.

So we have a number of things to accomplish today. I have a number of motions pending before me. There are two that I am going to rule on now. Those are the defendant's motion for an interlocutory appeal and plaintiff's motion to amend the complaint. So I will rule with respect to those on the record today.

After that, we will turn to defendant's motion to unseal plaintiff's name. I want to hear further argument with respect to that motion. I am unlikely to rule today and will

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likely reserve ruling with respect to that motion, but I do want to hear from the parties a bit more with respect to that motion.

After that, we will take up the schedule in this case, the parties' proposed confidentiality order, and one of the discovery disputes that I have before me. So that's what I have for my agenda today.

Anything else before we get to those items,
Ms. Christensen?

MS. CHRISTENSEN: Nothing from plaintiff, thank you.

THE COURT: Ms. Estrich?

MS. ESTRICH: Nothing, your Honor. Thank you.

THE COURT: All right. So I have reviewed the parties' submissions regarding defendants's motion for an interlocutory appeal at ECF no. 122. I'm going to rule on the record now.

The Court grants defendant's motion pursuant to 28 United States Code 1292(b). A district court is permitted to certify an interlocutory order for appeal when: (1) the order involves a controlling question of law; (2) as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion; and (3) an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation. There is no dispute that the first and third elements are met here. The only question is whether there is a substantial ground for a

difference of opinion. This element can be met either where:
"(1) there is conflicting authority on the issue; or (2) the
issue is particularly difficult and of first impression for the
Second Circuit." That is from Capital Records LLC v. Vimeo

LLC, 972 F.Supp.2d 537, 551 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). The Court agrees

that both circumstances are present.

Although the Court disagrees with the conclusion reached by Judge Kaplan in *Bellino*, that decision does suggest that there is grounds for a difference of opinion. That decision also supports that the issue of preemption here is a particularly difficult one—not only because of *Bellino* but also the relative lack of analogous case law, particularly on the issue of conflict preemption. And, this is a question that the Second Circuit has not yet answered, nor has the New York Court of Appeals. The Court therefore grants defendant's motion but will not stay this case while that appeal is pending.

With respect to plaintiff's motion for leave to amend the complaint, which is at ECF No. 91, I have reviewed the parties' briefing on this issue as well. The Court grants plaintiff's motion to amend the complaint. Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that leave to amend "shall be freely given when justice so requires." "Under this liberal standard, a motion to amend should be denied only if the moving party has unduly delayed or acted in bad faith, the

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opposing party will be unfairly prejudiced if leave is granted, or the proposed amendment is futile." Agerbrink v. Model Services LLC, 155 F.Supp.3d 458, 452 (S.D.N.Y. 2016). The nonmovant bears the burden of showing prejudice, bad faith, and futility. See United States v. Bon Secours Health System, Incorporated, 567 F.Supp.3d 429, 438 (S.D.N.Y. 2021).

Here, there is no undue delay. We are at the outset of this case. Discovery has yet to commence, and as such, there is no undue delay and no prejudice to defendant related to plaintiff amending the complaint at this time.

Defendant has also not met his burden with respect to bad faith. Defendant argues that bad faith is established here because of the delay in making these changes. He also argues that the substance of the proposed amendment is suspect because the new allegations do not bear on the sufficiency of plaintiff's claim. Neither of these arguments demonstrate bad faith. First, courts regularly allow delays of this length and even longer without finding bad faith. See Agerbrink, 155 F.Supp.3d at 253 (collecting cases). Also, delay alone is not enough. Second, plaintiff contends that the amendments are simply to clarify what was previously alleged. That also does not indicate bad faith. And defendant, who bears the burden here, has not pointed to anything to credibly indicate bad faith in the timing of this requested amendment.

Lastly, defendant has not demonstrated futility.

plaintiff's motion.

Although defendant contends that the additions to the complaint would not survive a Rule 12(f) motion, that is not the standard for futility. Amendments are futile if they fail to cure prior deficiencies or fail to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). See Pyskaty v. Wide World of Cars LLC, 856 F.3d 216, 224-225 (2d Cir. 2017). Defendant has not, and cannot, argue that the amendments fail to state a claim or fail to cure prior deficiencies. As such, defendant fails to identify how any of the changes are futile and, for those reasons, the Court grants

I know that there was a sealing motion that was also attached to this motion as well. The parties are directed to refile the documents relevant to this motion with redactions consistent with the Court's order at ECF No. 106.

All right. So that takes care of those two motions.

I want to now turn to the motion to unseal plaintiff's name. I have reviewed what the parties submitted. I want to specifically focus on a few factors in particular from the Sealed Plaintiff factors. Those are, first, whether the plaintiff has kept her identity with respect to the allegations in this case against Mr. Black confidential; second, the prejudice to defendant; third, the particularized harm to plaintiff from disclosure; and, fourth, plaintiff's vulnerabilities.

So with that, I will start with counsel for defendant

first since you brought this motion, and we will hear from you all with respect to it.

MS. PERRY: Thank you, your Honor.

With respect to the first factor that your Honor identified, the plaintiff's -- whether or not she has kept her identity confidential previously, the answer to that is firmly no, and I don't think there is a serious counterargument to that.

The plaintiff went far out of her way to publicize claims of her alleged trafficking at the hands of Jeff Epstein. She courted, by using hashtags and DMs—direct messages—to people with large followings. She courted a public following on Twitter, as it was then known. She also went on Twitter Live—Twitter Spaces I believe it is called—where -- approximately four dozen times, by the way, where she had thousands and thousands of viewers in realtime. And according to witnesses, on every occasion, or nearly every occasion, she stated and restated the allegations that have come up in this complaint.

Now, she really hadn't said a word of any alleged trafficking until approximately July of 2022, whereupon she launched effectively a blitz on Twitter and made these claims and then amplified them as much as possible. So a lot of the allegations in this complaint are out there publicly. And with respect to Mr. Black in particular, she told at least two

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people that she had befriended on Twitter the allegations that she makes in this complaint against him specifically. Now, we have been hampered in our ability to reach further witnesses because she has remained anonymous on the caption, which I know your Honor will — you know, that that is what we are here for.

And that also goes to another factor of prejudice to defendant.

THE COURT: Just on this factor with the two people that she did tell, that's not the equivalent of publicly revealing her identity with respect to the allegations in this case, right?

MS. PERRY: It was on a public forum but, correct, your Honor, it was via direct message. But there were people who were strangers to her who she was talking to about the general trafficking allegations and who she offered, willingly, voluntarily, and initiated this contact and these allegations. So we do not know how many people she has said this to. These are just people who we happened to speak with. But there are no doubt many others, and we would see that if we were permitted to proceed without her being able to cloak herself in anonymity.

THE COURT: How would you be able to see that if her name was revealed?

MS. PERRY: Well, we believe and this is one of the factors, to jump ahead to prejudice to defendant. Many courts

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have found that it is — including your Honor in a recent case, Doe v. Combs, that this asymmetry in discovery is highly prejudicial, so we are now at a moment when we are about to proceed with discovery and so the landscape has shifted. We did not oppose anonymity previously because we hoped and believed that our motion to dismiss would be granted and it would be unnecessary. Of course your Honor has ruled, and we now believe that in order to conduct a full-throated discovery, including of third parties, that we need to be able to use her name, just as she is able to use Mr. Black's name and has in a severely reputation-ruining way.

Your Honor has found, and other courts in this district have found, that this kind of asymmetry is more profound in cases involving substantial publicity, and that is exactly where we are. This case and attending cases have attracted a tremendous amount of publicity. Mr. Black has been branded a child rapist to the world, and he needs to be able to defend himself; and we believe that, in order to do so, we need to be able to use her name, including with, again, third parties and the discovery that —

THE COURT: Well, if you aware of who the third parties are, right, you haven't been prevented from interviewing witnesses. It sounds like you all have interviewed quite a few, right? I think — so what is preventing from you interviewing further witnesses with her

name —

MS. PERRY: Well, we have been very careful, your Honor, in those interviews. We did not put any information out there. We did not initially ourselves use her name. And it was obvious who some of those people were. She made claims about having been trafficked as a 16-year-old and having missed countless days of school, so of course we are going to want to speak with her family, who is more than willing to speak with us and to debunk her story. So it was easy enough to go to her parents, to her sister, her friends, you know, people that were in that close circle, and ask them, hey, what do you know, if anything, about this. It was really very open ended.

We would obviously like to do more targeted discovery. And even now in the subpoenas that have been issued, her name isn't being used. So I think it is just a — it is a significant burden for us to have to keep this kind of care. And again, we won't have potential witnesses reaching out to us unless her name is disclosed.

THE COURT: I understand that point, that there aren't — without her name being identified, people aren't sort of like, oh, I know who this person is and coming to you with information that may be relevant. But what prevents you — it sounds like — I'm not hearing anything that is preventing you from reaching out to witnesses who you are already aware of and gathering information with respect to the plaintiff.

MS. PERRY: Well, the witnesses that we are aware of, we have spoken with them. Of course, every time we do that in a very orderly and respectful way, we are accused of retaliation. But we have done that to an extent, but we can only go so far.

We can't subpoen her school records. We can't subpoen other witnesses just out of the blue and use her name as they have. They have sent out a battery of third-party subpoenas, which I know we will talk about, that they can ask whatever — they have free range. They can ask whatever they want. We are not permitted to do that right now. We are being extremely careful in following your Honor's ruling, but we would like the opportunity, now that we are in discovery, to be able to meet like with like and be able to issue subpoenas as well without fear of violating your Honor's order or being accused of retaliation.

THE COURT: And just to clarify, there are specific witnesses that you are aware of that you have not subpoenaed because you believe you are prohibited from doing so?

MS. PERRY: Yes, your Honor. We have included those in our brief as well. It does include academic records, medical records, people who knew her before she claimed in the past couple of years to have autism, down syndrome, and the like.

THE COURT: All right. Why don't you move to

particularized harm to plaintiff.

MS. PERRY: Yes, your Honor.

We believe that she hasn't articulated any. She has just said that she will be harmed. What she does say, she lists two factors. One, she claims that Mr. Black has already retaliated against her, but she has not been able to show that. We have known for over a year this woman's identity and there has been absolutely no form of retaliation. The one specific incident that they cite has been debunked and that is that there was an ominous, large, white Suburban parked outside her house. Turns out that was a neighbor's car. So there really is nothing.

The plaintiff has a burden to articulate something that is more than just general harm that every plaintiff accuses someone of sex trafficking would feel or sexual violence would feel. And so I think certainly the burden is on them there, and they haven't done anything other than to say she will be harmed. And they are required to provide some backup for it and they haven't done so.

THE COURT: All right. In terms of plaintiff's vulnerabilities here, obviously she is not currently a minor. What she alleges is that she was a minor at the time of the — relevant to the claim here. But unlike the decision — my decision in *Combs*, there do appear to be other vulnerabilities that this plaintiff in particular has alleged with respect to

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medical concerns and disabilities that were not present in Combs. So why isn't that sufficient to meet the vulnerability factor here?

MS. PERRY: Your Honor, there is no law that says that a person who has reached the age of majority, even if they have other vulnerabilities, that they should remain unanimous. Now, I understand the factors, the ten-factor test is not exhaustive and your Honor is free to consider anything your Honor thinks relevant, but I do want to point out that we have found and they have cited to no law that would be on point.

But more than that, your Honor, it is true that she claims these things. It is also true that we have significant evidence that belies those things. But I understand your Honor's taking the allegations. But she is claiming to have the developmental age of a 12-year-old, and yet she filed under her own name. She did not ask for a quardian. She filed in her own name, so she is competent to make these types of decisions and there is no evidence that she cannot. She filed a — I won't even characterize the allegations, but they are horrific by any standard and very, very detailed and very graphic and very particular from events that she claims happened over 20 years ago. Clearly this is a woman who went to high school, to college and, according to her, law school. So she has the ability to be able to prosecute this case, as we have seen, and to conduct discovery under her own name.

Ob72DoeC 1 is no law to the contrary. 2 Thank you. THE COURT: 3 Thank you, your Honor. MS. PERRY: 4 THE COURT: One final question for you. 5 identities of the plaintiffs in the case before Judge Rakoff 6 involving Jeffrey Epstein have been kept confidential, correct? 7 Yes, your Honor. MS. PERRY: 8 What would your response be to the THE COURT: 9 argument that it would be somewhat unfair to reveal plaintiff's 10 name here when sort of similarly situated plaintiffs names have 11 been kept confidential? 12 MS. PERRY: Your Honor, that is a completely different 13 situation than this case, where no one has asked that they be 14 deanonymized. That has been unopposed. We did not oppose the 15 anonymization initially, as your Honor noted in weighting that 16 as a significant factor in your Honor's previous ruling. 17 because we have reached the point of discovery, the situation 18 has changed, the landscape has shifted, and we do need to be 19 able to conduct full-throated discovery. So I would just say, 20 your Honor, that is not the same as this case. Were we to 21 agree to continue in anonymity, obviously we wouldn't be here 22 and your Honor wouldn't have to spend any time ruling.

Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Ms. Christensen.

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MS. CHRISTENSEN: Thank you.

Thank you, your Honor. I am just going to start, if I may, right where we just left off because on one hand, the defendant has claimed that they are hindered in discovery and one of the examples of that was that witnesses aren't coming forward. Yet at the same time, they just told your Honor that thousands and thousands of followers on Twitter somehow knew who our client is. So they both can't be true. So if it's true that she has already disclosed her identity in connection with this case, then you would think those thousands of people would have come forward. So that's my point on that issue.

THE COURT: Let me follow up on the prejudice to defendant here and their claims with respect to not being able to obtain discovery.

MS. CHRISTENSEN: Right.

THE COURT: What is your response to their claim that they cannot issue subpoenas or get medical records or school records? Is it your position that they are prevented from doing so?

MS. CHRISTENSEN: No, your Honor. That's what I was going to move to next in that we do have a protective order that was filed yesterday in this case. There is an easy work-around for that. We can add an addendum to the protective order that if a nonparty subpoena goes out, the person signs that agreement that her name could be used with those nonparty

subpoenaed witnesses. We certainly, for example, would not have an objection to defendant filing his own request to the school for her records, although we can also give them to defendant in discovery. But again, to use her name for a purpose like that, we would not have an objection to. So I think with a protective order and having nonparties who are subpoenaed to sign that, that it would be perfectly reasonable to expect that her name is disclosed. I mean that's something that we were considering ourselves. We just didn't do it yet because we didn't have the protective order in place, so we didn't use her name in our subpoenas. But I imagine we might be reissuing some of them with the copy of the protective order, and then we would disclose the name. So I think there is a work around on that.

We obviously dispute the allegations about her telling thousands and thousands of people on Twitter anything about Leon Black. And I think that the glaring omission in the argument is if she was saying something about Jeffrey Epstein, it doesn't mean that it was also about Leon Black. And so I haven't seen anything or heard anything that she spoke specifically about Leon Black.

As to the two people evidently who they have spoken to who directly messaged our client, one of them—and if your Honor would like an extra submission—asked her to send dirty pictures of herself to him, okay? So that's who we are talking

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about. People reached out to our client from something on Twitter.

So I am fully confident that she was not interacting with 50- or 60-year-old men on Twitter about Leon Black, and we haven't seen anything about that.

THE COURT: I'm not sure — I think it would be helpful if I saw those messages, because I'm not exactly understanding the context here. These are two random people who reached out to her and then she disclosed what happened with respect to Leon Black?

MS. CHRISTENSEN: No. She never brought up Leon — to the people that they wrote about in their motion, my understanding is they were people when she said she was a survivor — a survivor of Epstein reached out to her. It is true that people did reach out to her and in fact that's one reason she went off Twitter. It's not easy for her to know exactly who might be a good person versus somebody who is trying to, in a nuanced way, convince her to send photos of herself without clothes on. That is why she is not on Twitter. I don't believe there is a single message or anything from Twitter that ever mentions Leon Black's name. I have not seen that.

THE COURT: So it is just these — as far as you know, these two people who she did not know before at all who seemingly had bad motives to reach out to her who she disclosed

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MS. CHRISTENSEN: I don't even know what exactly defendant says she disclosed. It was in connection with saying she was an Epstein victim, but she made that post.

THE COURT: Right. But what did she disclose to these two people?

MS. CHRISTENSEN: I don't believe anything more than that. I would have to go back and read the messages. It's been a while. I apologize, your Honor. There is no specific — certainly nothing about this case, but I don't believe any specifics about what actually happened to her with Epstein.

THE COURT: What about with Leon Black?

MS. CHRISTENSEN: Definitely not with Leon Black.

THE COURT: All right. So just to be clear, you dispute there were two people that she randomly shared this information with with respect to Leon Black specifically.

MS. CHRISTENSEN: With respect to Leon Black, yes.

THE COURT: All right. Do you have those messages that they are referring to?

MS. CHRISTENSEN: Not with me today, your Honor. They weren't in their motion. I can certainly get them quickly when I get back to the office and send them to you.

THE COURT: All right.

MS. CHRISTENSEN: That segues somewhat into the issue

of her individualized harm. Our client falls into one of those categories where she doesn't fit into a neat box, and so, yes, she did graduate from college and she can do well academically, you know, taking tests and things like that. Socially, not so well. And to say that she can't — other, she did remember things specifically and that happened to her a long time ago, but that doesn't mean that she still does not developmentally behave and see life through a lens of a much younger person than her chronological age. For certain things, she can come across in social situations as behaving like an adult and at other times, you know, she is playing with dolls. So there is a large disparity between what we are talking about here, I do believe.

And defense counsel is correct that she did not need a guardian to commence this action. So I don't dispute that. I do believe, though, that her reactions, just as an example, by repeatedly being called a pathological opportunist and a liar in many of these court letters and filings is extremely hurtful and damaging to her and she gets very upset. So it is not something, as I said, that fits into a neat box, oh, she has this diagnosis and this is what she is, so I can't give you that.

THE COURT: So how does that — obviously anyone being accused of lying in a court filing would be upset, but what is it particular to her and her diagnoses that sort of separates

her from others?

MS. CHRISTENSEN: Well, they are actually seizing on her — she put out there that she is autistic and developmentally disabled, and then they have somehow twisted that and have said multiple times that she is lying about those very things. To her, that's part of her identity that they are challenging the fact that she is autistic or developmentally disabled and then they are using that both to say that she doesn't know what she is talking about, right, and now they are saying, well, she is probably lying about those things, too, so that can't hurt her in any way. I would say the part that separates her is chronologically, she is 38, but she in many ways experiences the world like a teenager.

Unless your Honor wants to hear about the name calling, I will move on from that right now.

The other point that defense counsel brought up in terms of damage to him and all of the publicity in this case, the only reason it is getting all this publicity is the defendant is a guy who everybody knows paid over \$160 million to Jeffrey Epstein and then he paid \$62.5 million to the U.S. Virgin Islands in connection with Jeffrey Epstein and associated claims, and he was the head of a large private equity firm and so now he is wondering why this is getting so much publicity? His name has been associated with Jeffrey Epstein for a long time, and we believe strongly that, based on

those amounts of money that were paid to Mr. Epstein and the \$62.5 million settlement with the U.S. Virgin Islands, that there are other women who Mr. Black has settled claims with. So I don't see how it is any surprise that the media is following a case against Mr. Black. I don't think there is anything different that they have articulated regarding him versus any other case. And since we file these cases often and our position is always that if the client wishes to be a Jane Doe that that's how we file the case and that's what we try to do. And as was alluded to here before, not every defendant disputes that.

So if the main argument is that they weren't able to conduct discovery, I think we have a work-around for that.

And the second point is that they already, even as she has been a Jane Doe, have interviewed so many people. They went to and found high school friends of our client who they have interviewed. So to suggest that no one in those interviews knew who they were talking about is a bit ridiculous. And they showed up at the home of our client's biological parents. So, they had private investigators at the doorstep. When the parents came home and they walked up to their front door, there were private investigators waiting for them.

THE COURT: I understand. You are not saying that there is anything improper about that, correct?

MS. CHRISTENSEN: In terms of the actual interview, no. But I'm just saying it hasn't hindered their ability to conduct the discovery that they claim.

THE COURT: Obviously I recently decided a similar issue, this similar issue in *Combs*. How would you distinguish this case?

MS. CHRISTENSEN: Well, because our client — it wasn't her choice as a minor when she was told to be in a certain place at a certain time and meet with Mr. Black. That was not her decision. And while he is a public figure in the Wall Street circles, I do think when there is a client or a victim who is in a long-term — any type of a long-term relationship with a public figure, that they themselves have placed them out into the public as identified as a girlfriend or at least a friend or associate of that person and that that is a very different scenario than what happened with our client. So I think the public figure cases are very different from the cases in which both the plaintiff and the defendant are private individuals, and I do think that the factors under Sealed Plaintiff and Sealed Defendant should be varied when it comes to public figures. And that's one reason.

And the last thing I will say about not submitting proof in the form of — I'm not sure what exactly they wanted to see, but again, I feel strongly that not every plaintiff or a victim in a sexuality case even has lawyers. So to suggest

that they are required to get an expert opinion of some sort just to proceed as a Jane Doe is really placing a high burden on somebody who might not have those resources. And there are plenty of plaintiffs that do meet that category and might proceed pro se and we are establishing a very high bar for somebody like that; that if you have a lot of money and you can afford a medical expert of some sort, then you get to be a Jane Doe. But if you are poor, then you might not. And I don't think that's an appropriate standard to place on a victim, so that's my point.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you, Ms. Christensen.

All right. Ms. Perry, do you want to respond very briefly?

MS. PERRY: Yes, your Honor.

Your Honor, some of Ms. Christensen's points have highlighted the very, very specific and clear prejudice to our client in not being able to use plaintiff's name. We just found out about a new person today that the plaintiff had reached out to and told these allegations about Mr. Black. The two people who we are aware of who she told about Mr. Black are both women. It's not this creepy guy who asked her for photos. So there are other people out there. And it is important that, as much as Ms. Christensen just now suggested an addendum to a confidentiality agreement we had already worked out, that does not begin to do for us what we need in order to defend this

case. We would like — so one of the people who we found out about on Twitter figured out that this case was brought by the person she knew from Twitter because the plaintiff had told her exactly the same things. So I know Ms. Christensen says she is not sure about that. That is what happened. The allegations that she had told this woman on Twitter not too long before she filed the complaint very much track what's in the complaint, and this woman put that together and reached out to us, and there are no doubt many other people —

THE COURT: Let me ask you this: I think there may be a distinction between a plaintiff confiding in a couple people, right, about what happened to them and that wouldn't sort of necessarily weigh as that person is now not keeping what happened to them confidential, right? Like if that person is just confiding in a few people, maybe it is somebody who has also experienced trafficking and they want to sort of confide in a person who has a similar experience, that to me doesn't really support the idea that they are now not keeping their claims confidential. But randomly reaching out to people and just telling whoever asks, that's sort of the underside of that scale. So where do you see these — what's happening with plaintiff telling people on that sort of scale?

MS. PERRY: It's on that end of the scale. So we really need to just start, and I think we can end, with the fact that she told thousands of people on Twitter about the

very allegations against Mr. Epstein that she alleges in this complaint. They cannot elide that fact. Ms. Christensen started by saying, well, people could have come forward because she did say these comments on Twitter. So she conceded that. But of course she has not used her name here publicly, so they cannot make those connections. But that really -- I think we could begin and end there. A large part of her complaint is that she was trafficked by Jeffrey Epstein to Leon Black, and a lot of that is out there. It is just dots cannot be connected because she has decided to proceed anonymously. So it is not just the random outreaches that she initiated to people on Twitter talking about Mr. Black specifically, but it's the thousands of people that she regularly made these allegations to about the core allegations in the complaint.

And your Honor, I just wanted to finish one little point, I think there was a strand out there, about this notion of an addendum to our confi. That would not give us the freedom to just reach out to people ourselves. Forget even with a third-party subpoena, but just do informal interviews, which we now have conceded there is nothing wrong with it. He has to be able to do that to defend himself.

So unless your Honor has any further questions, thank you.

THE COURT: So I will reserve ruling with respect to that. I know there are a couple of sealing requests with

respect to this motion as well that I will just handle in one decision.

So now moving along to the parties' proposed case management plan, the schedule is fine. I will so order it and add a case management conference date, likely May 1 of next year at 1 p.m. -- excuse me, 11 a.m.

I just want to make a note now about discovery disputes. It appears there may be some in the pipeline that you all have. I just want to draw your attention to my individual rule with respect to discovery disputes. They should be submitted via a joint letter after a meet-and-confer process, obviously, as required under all applicable rules. But one point I want to make specifically is that the parties should comply with my rules that require that you all include in the joint letter the position the parties started with at the beginning of the meet-and-confer and each party's final proposed compromise and why the opposing side finds the compromise position insufficient. So please include that in any joint letter. Any letters without that information will be denied.

I know that this is a tough case and you all have spent a lot of time, I think unnecessarily, attacking one another. You all should focus on the issues when you bring disputes and do not waste words and space on unnecessarily attacking one another.

I have also reviewed the confidentiality proposed order at ECF 149 which is fine, and I will enter that as well.

The last issue that I have is the discovery dispute regarding documents in Judge Rakoff's case. The relevant letters start at ECF No. 107. I have reviewed the parties' letters regarding that request. Those are documents before Judge Rakoff that are sealed in his case. Because of that, counsel for defendant should direct any requests regarding those materials to Judge Rakoff.

I know there is also a request to bifurcate discovery in this case with respect to those documents first and then other discovery. We are not going to do that. We are moving forward with discovery. You all should seek those documents through Judge Rakoff's case, and he will make a decision with respect to those documents, and you are all otherwise moving forward with discovery. They should not be done through subpoenas of third parties and counsel.

There is another outstanding discovery dispute related to class counsel from that case before Judge Rakoff. I will address that in an order after this conference.

All right. I know there were some concerns about some of the subpoenas that plaintiff's counsel has been issuing. I just want to remind all counsel the issues here I think are clear as to what is appropriate. What I am hearing is that subpoenas are being sought that are potentially seeking

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information that's outside the bounds of what is relevant. So please I think you all should be mindful of what you are seeking here. It needs to be relevant and not harassing, and I will not hesitate to quash subpoenas if I find that they are outside of those bounds. I have nothing before me with respect to that. I just wanted to make clear that I have some concerns, but I will address issues as they come to me. All right?

Is there anything else for us to discuss today, Ms. Christensen?

MS. CHRISTENSEN: No. Not from the plaintiff. you.

MR. CARLINSKY: Your Honor was very clear on all the points. I appreciate it. We are then going to reach out to Judge Rakoff, and your Honor made clear you don't want us to do it through subpoenas of the parties. Do we have the Court's approval, though, that we can say to the Court-Judge Rakoff, that is—that we are before your Honor and that the Court's preference is that we address the issues directly with his Honor?

> THE COURT: Absolutely.

MR. CARLINSKY: Okay. Appreciate that.

THE COURT: All right. Anything further?

MS. ESTRICH: Nothing further, your Honor.

THE COURT: We are adjourned. Thank you all. 000